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The law of environmental liability has already been the object of several comparative endeavours. 
This article seeks to bring a different perspective to the debate, by examining selected developments 
in the field through the lens of the emerging global environmental law scholarship. It brings the 
comparative method of analysis into a multi-level context with a view to identifying the emergence 
of common legal responses to the problem of liability and reparation for environmental harm 
across different jurisdictions and regulatory levels. The analysis will focus on a ‘novel’ set of 
environmental liability regimes, which specifically address damage to the environment and to 
natural resources, as distinct from more traditional categories of damage to property and other 
individual rights arising as a consequence of environmental pollution. These include: the United 
States Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, and the Oil 
Pollution Act, which constitute a pioneering attempt to envisage a public law-oriented system of 
liability and restoration for damage to natural resources; the European Union Environmental 
Liability Directive; and selected, recent international treaty developments. The article argues that, 
while adopted within different legal orders and regulatory contexts, these environmental liability 
regimes share common features, which correspond to the ontological aspects of environmental 
damage and ultimately reflect a common understanding of the environment as a global public good. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The question of devising appropriate and effective rules on liability and redress for environmental 
damage has been the object of an intense and longstanding debate across different jurisdictions. At 
the international level, this issue moved up on the environmental agenda since the 1972 United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, when States decided to include the 
further development of ‘international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of 
pollution and other environmental damage’ among the future priority areas for international 
cooperation in the environmental field.1 In the following years, the International Law Commission 
embarked on a difficult and lengthy exercise aimed at the progressive development and codification 
of a set of general rules on the international liability of States for the harmful consequences arising 
out of hazardous activities.2 At the same time, the prospective adoption of appropriate procedures 
for the determination of liability and compensation for environmental harm was included as a 
pactum de contrahendo provision in several international conventions.3 
 
Despite those scholarly efforts and political commitments, however, the international community 
has constantly struggled to achieve consensus over a set of generally applicable and legally binding 
international rules on environmental liability.4 But while the definition of general international law 
norms on liability and redress for environmental harm still appears at an embryonic stage, 	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1 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, found in: Report of the UN Conference on the Human 
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2 Working Group on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by 
International Law, in: ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirtieth session, 8 May-28 July 
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4 A. Boyle, ‘Globalising Environmental Liability: the Interplay of National and International Law’, 17:1 Journal of 
Environmental Law (2005), 3. 
	  	  
significant developments taking place through sector-specific international conventions, regional 
instruments, national legislation and judicial decisions have contributed to raise novel perspectives 
on the scope and role of liability rules in the environmental context. The recognition of the intrinsic 
value of natural resources and the inclusion of the public and collective dimension of ecological 
damage into the scope of application of traditional private law-based liability rules feature as the 
most distinctive traits that characterize current developments in this area of the law. 
 
This article aims to capture the evolving normative developments in the field of liability and redress 
for environmental damage by providing a comparative and multi-level analysis of recent legislative 
developments at the national, European and international level. It focuses on a ‘novel’ set of 
environmental liability regimes specifically addressing damage to the environment and to natural 
resources, as distinct from more traditional categories of damage to property and other individual 
rights arising as a consequence of environmental pollution. These include: the United States (US) 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) or 
‘Superfund’,5 and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),6 which constitute a pioneering attempt to envisage a 
public law-oriented system of liability and restoration for damage to natural resources; the 
European Union (EU) Environmental Liability Directive,7  which draws inspiration from the 
American example; and selected, recent international treaty developments. 
 
The article argues that, while adopted within different legal orders and regulatory contexts, this 
‘new’ generation of environmental liability regimes shares common features, which correspond to 
the ontological aspects of environmental damage and ultimately reflect a common understanding of 
the environment as a global public good. From a regulatory and governance perspective, they 
manifest a gradual move towards complementing traditional private law-based remedies with public 
law-oriented solutions focusing on the restoration of the impaired natural resources and the re-
establishment of the ecological balance. Adopting a global environmental law approach to the 
analysis of the interaction and reciprocal influences between the different legal orders and 
regulatory levels, the article concludes by reflecting on the prospective development of international 
law in the complex field of environmental liability.8 
 
THE EVOLVING SCOPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: FRAMING 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS IN A MULTI-LEVEL 
CONTEXT 
 
Liability and compensation for environmental damage have for long time been addressed mostly in 
an indirect fashion, by relying on concepts and principles of civil liability already available in 
domestic systems. Thus, in most European jurisdictions and in the US private law norms on civil 
liability or the common law of torts have in the past represented the primary vehicle to claim 
reparation when environmental pollution interfered with the enjoyment of private property rights or 
caused personal injuries. Recourse to civil liability litigation has also been a popular option in case 
of transboundary environmental pollution, in order to fill the gaps left by the absence of an 
appropriate and effective international legal framework on international responsibility for 
environmental harm. 9  In recent decades, however, growing environmental concerns and the 	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increasing awareness of the intrinsic value of the environment and of natural resources have 
prompted the need for new and more specific approaches to the question of environmental liability. 
A distinctive trait that characterizes more recent developments is the recognition of harm to the 
ecological components of the environment and to natural resources as a separate category of 
compensable damage, distinct from the more traditional categories of damage to property and 
personal injury arising as a consequence of environmental pollution. 
 
The inclusion of environmental components among the interests protected by environmental 
liability rules has raised a whole new set of issues concerning the scope of application and the 
underlying objectives of environmental liability. It became clear that the specificities of 
environmental damage could not easily be addressed through the classic private law structures of 
tort law or civil liability.10 First, there are fundamental limits related to the range of interests which 
the law of civil liability or tort have originally been conceived to address. Protection of the 
environment or the maintenance of good environmental quality are not among the primary 
objectives of civil liability. This, in turn, has implications for the identification of the subjects 
entitled to have standing in cases where significant impairment to environmental quality is at stake, 
and on the range of available remedies. The requirement of a necessary link between civil liability 
actions and the existence and infringement of an individual right does not fully match with the 
broader environmental objective to claim reparation for damage to public spaces and unowned 
natural resources.11 Case law in the United Kingdom has highlighted the difficulty to extend the 
right to claim an action in private nuisance beyond the sphere of the directly affected individuals 
with a proprietary right on the affected land.12 Furthermore, the remedies normally available under 
the common law of torts or civil liability may not necessarily coincide with the interests in the 
protection of the environment. From an environmental perspective, restoration of the environment 
to the conditions prior to the damage, or the availability of measures aimed at achieving as far as 
possible an equivalent result, appear as a more effective remedy than monetary compensation. But 
even if monetary compensation were applicable, the translation of ecological damage in monetary 
terms can become a very difficult task, given that most natural resources, such as wildlife and 
biodiversity, do not have a market value. 
 
These and similar questions have for a long time confronted domestic courts dealing with 
environmental pollution claims and lawmakers attempting to define appropriate regimes of 
environmental liability. The solutions thus far range from the adjustment of classic civil liability 
rules to accommodate environmental considerations, to the development of ad hoc and specific 
regimes of liability and reparation for damage to natural resources. The role of courts in this respect 
is not to be underestimated. There are several examples in which domestic judges faced with claims 
regarding environmental pollution have creatively managed to stretch the boundaries of applicable 
laws in order to accommodate environmental concerns.13 In some cases, their decisions have fed, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
approach is prominent in several international conventions establishing uniform liability regimes for damage caused by 
pollution occurring during the operation of hazardous activities (see further below). 
10 There has been a wide and longstanding doctrinal debate on the application of tort law and civil liability to pursue 
environmental objectives. See, e.g., M. Lee, ‘Tort, Regulation and Environmental Liability’, 22:1 Legal Studies (2002), 
33; P. Cane, ‘Are Environmental Harms Special’, 13:1 Journal of Environmental Law (2001), 3; J. Lowry and R. 
Edmunds (eds.), Environmental Protection and the Common Law (Hart Publishing, 2000). 
11 E.H.P. Brans, Liability for Damage to Public Natural Resources: Standing, Damage and Damage Assessment 
(Kluwer Law International, 2001). See also the decision of the US Court in the Amoco Cadiz case, in Re Oil Spill by the 
Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France (Parts 1 and 2), MDL Docket No. 376, 1988, in which the Court in response to a 
claim by a French local authority for wildlife killed by the oil spill from the Amoco Cadiz tanker held that ‘this claimed 
damage is subject to the principle of res nullius and is not compensable for lack of standing of any person or entity to 
claim therefor’. Ibid., at 394. 
12 See, e.g., Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd., [1997] 2 WLR 684. 
13  Attempts have been made to overcome some of the difficulties faced by environmental nongovernmental 
organizations and public interest groups wishing to bring a civil law case in a situation of environmental harm. In the 
	  	  
even only indirectly, into the elaboration of statutory schemes of environmental liability at the 
national and international levels.14 In other instances, judicial developments at the domestic level 
have triggered the revision of existing international law instruments.15 This reflects a process of 
gradual interaction between domestic and international law in the quest towards appropriate 
responses to the questions of liability and reparation for damage to natural resources and to the 
environment. 
 
From this perspective, the use of the comparative law method in the analysis of the different 
regulatory approaches and case law developments at the national and international level proves 
particularly helpful in tracing common patterns across different jurisdictions and different liability 
regimes. For example, the comparative analysis of Anglo-American jurisprudence and other EU 
jurisdictions reveals an interesting convergence among the various legal systems’ attempts to refine 
the existing rules of civil liability in order to overcome the substantial hurdles faced by private 
victims of environmental pollution when establishing the link of causation or the defendant’s 
fault.16 Particularly in the wake of industrial modernization and the proliferation of environmentally 
harmful activities, countries in Europe and in the US have developed specific systems of strict 
liability for hazardous activities, although the scope of application of those specific rules is in 
practice quite different.17 At the international level, the comparative analysis of several international 
civil liability conventions offers an interesting example of how specific solutions adopted in one 
treaty system – namely the concept of environmental damage provided by the 1992 Oil Pollution 
convention18 – have been retained and transferred to other conventional liability regimes.19 
 
There is an already extensive comparative legal scholarship examining how different jurisdictions 
have sought to elaborate appropriate responses to the specific features of environmental harm.20 
Interestingly, those comparative studies are not limited to the ‘horizontal’ analysis of environmental 
liability legislation in different domestic systems, but increasingly adopt a ‘vertical’ comparative 
perspective, featuring references to relevant international law developments. Therefore, those 
studies represent a good source for the identification of best practices in the definition of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Borcea case, for example, the District Court of Rotterdam has held that civil suits for damage are acceptable where the 
organization has incurred reasonable clean-up costs. See Borcea, District Court Rotterdam, 15 March 1992, 23 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1992), 513; see also G. Betlem, ‘Standing for Ecosystems – Going Dutch’, 
54:1 Cambridge Law Journal (1995), 153. 
14 National courts have in several cases recognized natural resource damage as a separate category, even independently 
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Environmental Protection by Means of International Liability Law (Enrich Schmidt, 1999), at 327-331. 
15 A. Bianchi, ‘Harm to the Environment in Italian Practice: the Interaction of International Law and Domestic Law’, in: 
P. Wetterstein (ed.), Harm to the Environment: the Right to Compensation and the Assessment of Damages (Clarendon 
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definition of damage under the Civil Liability Convention on Oil Pollution Damage. 
16 See generally M. Wilde, Civil Liability for Environmental Damage: Comparative Analysis of Law and Policy in 
Europe and the US, 2nd edn (Wolters Kluwer, 2013); for a comparative analysis of developments in Europe, see M. 
Hinteregger, Environmental Liability and Ecological Damage in European Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
17 H. Bocken, ‘Developments with Respect to Compensation for Damage Caused by Pollution’, in: B. Markesinis (ed.), 
The Gradual Convergence (Foreign Ideas, Foreign Influences and English Law on the Eve of 21st Century) (Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 226. 
18 Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (London, 7 
November 1992; in force 30 May 1996) (‘1992 Protocol’). 
19 L. De La Fayette, ‘The Concept of Environmental Damage in International Liability Regimes’, in: M. Bowman and 
A. Boyle (eds.), Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law: Problems of Definition and Valuation 
(Oxford University Press, 2002), 150. 
20 See, e.g., M. Wilde, n. 16 above; M. Hinteregger, n. 16 above; E.H.P. Brans, n. 11 above; M. Bowman and A. Boyle, 
n. 19 above; G. Betlem and E. Brans (eds.), Environmental Liability in the EU: The 2004 Directive Compared with US 
and Member States Law (Cameron May, 2006). 
	  	  
appropriate responses to the problem of environmental damage, particularly in relation to the 
structure of liability regimes, the available mechanisms of redress, as well as the methodologies for 
valuation and assessment of environmental harm. 
 
Building upon these findings, this article uses a comparative law approach in the multi-level 
analysis of liability regimes for natural resource damage in order to examine a more recent 
development, namely the transposition of regulatory models not only horizontally across different 
jurisdictions but also vertically across different legal orders. Global environmental law provides an 
appropriate conceptual and methodological framework for this comparative exercise.21 By contrast 
to traditional comparative scholarship, a global environmental law approach allows the drawing of 
analogies between different regulatory levels, thereby enabling a better understanding of the 
reciprocal influences and mutual interaction across different levels of governance in the definition 
of responses to common problems.22 Therefore, it offers an appropriate framework to explore the 
progressive translation of concepts and solutions elaborated at the domestic level up to the 
supranational and international level, and to assess the increasing degree of interaction between 
different actors (courts, lawmakers, the private sector and civil society) and different regulatory 
levels (domestic and international, public and private) in shaping the evolving role of environmental 
liability as a tool for environmental protection. 
 
DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVES ON LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM: THE US 
APPROACH 
 
The first steps towards the development of a statutory liability regime specifically covering damage 
to natural resources and to the ecological components of environment are found at the national 
level. The United States CERCLA of 1980 and the OPA of 1990 are two pioneering examples of an 
advanced environmental liability framework, which departs from the private law and individual 
dimension of tort remedies to explicitly address damage to natural resources and to the environment 
in their public and collective dimension.23 Notwithstanding their different material scope of 
application – respectively covering harm to natural resources arising as a consequence of the release 
of hazardous waste and other toxic substances into the environment (CERCLA), and as a 
consequence of a discharge of oil into the marine environment (OPA) – the two liability statutes 
share several common features and underlying objectives. They both originate from the US 
Congress’ dissatisfaction with the limited ability of tort law to address wider damage to natural 
resources and the public components of the environment.24 To overcome those limits, both statutes 
introduce a public, administrative law mechanism of liability, which combines some of the features 
of tort liability with the broader objective of providing a structured and effective system for the 
containment, clean-up and management of the hazardous release of toxic substances or oil into the 
environment. Thus, besides specific provisions on compensation for environmental damage, 
liability under both CERCLA and OPA also includes the costs of response action, such as clean-up 
and the removal of hazardous substances and oil. 
 
However, the most distinctive and innovative feature of US statutory liability law remains its 
provisions concerning the recovery for natural resources injury. In both statutes, the concept of 
natural resources is broadly defined to include ‘land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See T. Yang and R. V. Percival, n. 8 above. 
22 For global environmental law as a helpful methodological framework in comparative analysis, see also E. Morgera, 
‘Bilateralism at the Service of Community Interests? Non-Judicial Enforcement of Global Public Goods in the Context 
of Global Environmental Law’, 23:3 European Journal of International Law (2012), 743, at 746. 
23 Prior to CERCLA and OPA, strict liability for environmental damage was also introduced in the federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (or Clean Water Act) of 1972. 
24 See E.P.H. Brans, n. 11 above, at 65. 
	  	  
drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, 
appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States …, any State or local government or 
Indian tribe, or any foreign government’.25 This definition has been interpreted as including all 
those natural resources whose protection reflect a public interest and that are therefore subject to 
management or control of public authorities, irrespective of whether they are public or privately 
owned. Coherently with the public law dimension of the damage, CERCLA and OPA confer a 
pivotal role in the process of natural resource damage recovery to the trustees. These are public 
authorities of federal and state government, of Indian tribes and of foreign governments specifically 
empowered to present claims to recover injuries to natural resources under their jurisdiction on 
behalf of the public.26 Thus, while CERCLA and OPA do not rule out the possibility for private 
parties to bring claims for property or personal injury under general rules of tort law,27 they do not 
grant private persons the right to claim damages for injury to natural resources. 
 
This idea of public authorities as primary responsible for taking action for natural resource damage 
was not completely novel, but built upon the ancient US common law doctrines of public trust and 
parens patriae. Those doctrines already provided public authorities with the power to protect and 
manage natural resources on behalf of the citizens. However, their translation into the specific 
context of environmental liability has allowed to overcome the substantial difficulties of tort law in 
relation to the identification of appropriate subjects entitled to claim compensation for damage to 
the environment in the absence of specific individual personal or property rights. Furthermore, the 
conferral to public authorities of specific powers to claim reparation for environmental damage has 
contributed to address the limitations of the individualized and case-by-case response offered by 
civil liability lawsuits to pursue more publicly-oriented aspirations of environmental protection. In 
tort law, there is no obligation for a private claimant to pursue a claim in the public interest or to use 
the money received as compensation to remediate environmental damage.28 Thus, the private 
individual’s discretion as to whether ultimately to bring a claim and how to spend the compensation 
eventually obtained tends to make the private law tool of civil liability an unpredictable instrument 
in terms of achieving environmental effectiveness.29 In contrast to the private law paradigm, under 
CERCLA and OPA, trustees are bound to use all the sums recovered for the restoration of the 
impaired natural resources, their replacement or the acquisition of equivalent resources.30 
 
The trustees are also directly involved in the process of damage assessment and in the identification 
and definition of the most appropriate restoration measures. The process for the determination and 
quantification of damage to natural resources under CERCLA and OPA is defined in the Natural 
Resources Damage Assessment (NRDA) regulations, enacted respectively by the Department of 
Interior31 and the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.32 
Here, the environmental law underpinning of CERCLA and OPA is reflected in the progressive 
departure from a monetary evaluation of environmental damage based on the diminished value of 
natural resources to a restoration-based approach, whose ultimate aim is to return the injured natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 OPA, n. 6 above, Section 1001(20); a similar definition is found in CERCLA, n. 5 above, Section 101(16). 
26 CERCLA, n. 5 above, Section 107(f); OPA, n. 6 above, Section 2076(a). 
27 OPA also provides a separate cause of action for damage to land or personal property. 
28 See M. Lee, n. 10 above, at 41-42. 
29 S. Rose-Ackermann, ‘Public Law versus Private Law in Environmental Regulation: European Union Proposals in the 
Light of United States Experience’, 4:4 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (1995), 
312. 
30 See E.P.H. Brans, n. 11 above, at 74. 
31 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 CFR 11 (2004). 
32 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 15 CFR 990 (1997). 
	  	  
resources as far as possible to the baseline conditions.33 OPA explicitly provides that natural 
resource damage be measured on the basis of the costs of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing or 
acquiring the equivalent of the damaged natural resources, and on the costs for the assessment of 
the damage.34 Furthermore, in line with the perspective of repaying the public for the whole value 
of the impaired natural resources, CERCLA and OPA include compensation for the interim losses 
of resources from the time of the incident until the full recovery. Under OPA, a restoration-based 
approach is also the preferable method for the valuation of such interim losses. The recognition of 
the loss of natural resources services is very relevant, as it implicitly acknowledges the inherent 
value of natural resources and their importance for the public and for other resources and 
ecosystems. 
 
From an environmental protection perspective, a restoration-based approach aimed at returning the 
natural resources as far as possible to the conditions prior to the damage or at replacing them with 
alternative resources is preferable. It directly addresses injury to natural resources and it is the 
method that best accounts for the uniqueness of each particular resource.35 From a pragmatic point 
of view, as restoration costs are easier to estimate, it allows the bypassing of the difficulties and 
complexities in placing a monetary value on natural resources, thereby addressing the criticisms 
aimed at the various available economic valuation methodologies. However, from an economic and 
cost-benefit perspective, it has been argued that the downside of a restoration and replacement 
methodology is that the costs of restoration may in some case significantly exceed the value of 
natural resources or, conversely, may underestimate the biophysical damages suffered by natural 
resources; similarly, in some circumstances restoration costs may not entirely reflect the social and 
cultural value of natural resources, as these elements are not always predictable;36 indeed, especially 
in the case of off-site restoration, where the impracticability to achieve full restoration of the injured 
resources lead to replace them with equivalent resources at an alternative location, the benefits 
would not necessarily accrue to the affected population living in the original location of the 
damage. 
 
Despite the ongoing discussions on these points, and notwithstanding the shortcomings and 
difficulties that emerged during the implementation and application of OPA and CERCLA, the US 
environmental liability statutes can be considered as a landmark development in the evolution of 
environmental liability. Their provisions have offered a valuable solution to the very complex 
question of quantification and assessment of ecological damage; as discussed in the following 
sections, they have contributed to the inclusion of the ecological components of the environment 
and the value of natural resource services in the context of liability regimes adopted in other 
jurisdictions.37 From a comparative perspective, it is interesting to note that the US environmental 
liability regime was not the sole example of a public law approach to the question of environmental 
harm. In Italy, around the same time of the adoption of CERCLA, the shift from the ordinary tort 
law approach to environmental pollution to a more direct form of legal protection of environmental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 J.T. Ryan, ‘The Evolution of Natural Resource Damage Assessments under the Oil Pollution Act and the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act’, 6:1 Fordham Environmental Law Review 
(2011), 29. 
34 OPA, n. 6 above, Section 1006(d)(1). 
35 J. Peck, ‘Measuring Justice for Nature: Issues in Evaluating and Litigating Natural Resources Damages, 14:2 Journal 
of Land Use and Environmental Law (1999), 275, at 283. See also, in a comparative perspective, P. Sands and R.B. 
Stewart, ‘Valuation of Environmental Damage – US and International Law Approaches’, 5:4 Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law (1996), 290. 
36 See on this J. Boyd, ‘Lost Ecosystem Goods and Services as a Measure of Marine Damages’, in: M. Faure, H. Lixin 
and S. Hongjun (eds.), Maritime Pollution Liability and Policy: China, Europe and the US (Kluwer Law International, 
2010), 55. 
37 See also R.V. Percival, K.H. Cooper and M.M. Gravens, ‘CERCLA in a Global Context’, 41:4 Southwestern Law 
Review (2012), 727. 
	  	  
values took place, in a slightly different fashion compared to the US.38 Under the Italian legislation, 
the State and its local subdivisions, as trustees for the community, were entitled to pursue claims for 
environmental damage occurred through a violation of a legal or administrative provision of 
environmental protection. Remedies consisted of the restoration of the environment to the state 
prior to the occurrence of the damage or, if that was not feasible, monetary compensation calculated 
by the judge on the basis of an equitable appraisal. 
 
FROM THE NATIONAL TO THE SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL: THE EU DIRECTIVE ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY  
 
Shifting from the domestic to the supranational level, in the EU the development of a specific 
regime of liability and reparation for environmental damage has been the result of a long and 
notoriously difficult process which lasted almost ten years. During this process, the European 
Commission produced various drafts and several studies, and consulted widely with academia and 
other relevant stakeholders from the environmental and business communities. The final text of the 
Environmental Liability Directive was eventually adopted in April 2004. The new liability 
instrument aimed to fill an important gap left by the absence of a harmonized system of secondary 
rules on liability and reparation for environmental damage. 
 
Compared to the early harmonization efforts proposed in the late 1980s and early 1990s,39 and 
essentially focussed on the waste management sector, the Directive represents a significant 
departure in terms of objectives and structure of the liability regime. The legal basis of the 
Directive40 revealed already a move away from the internal market concerns that prompted initial 
Community intervention in the field, towards more genuine environmental law objectives. Leaving 
aside the wider doctrinal debate concerning the regulatory functions of liability and whether and to 
what extent it can fulfil goals of prevention and deterrence, it was clear from the beginning that the 
new liability instrument was intended to pursue broader EU policy objectives in addition to the 
classic functions of providing compensation and ensuring redress for environmental harm.41 In the 
Commission’s view, an EU-wide environmental liability regime would contribute to the effective 
implementation of the polluter-pays principle, as one of the fundamental principles of EU 
environmental policy,42 while at the same time boosting private operators’ compliance with 
environmental norms. In this respect, the establishment of a scheme of private operators’ liability is 
also a response to prominent concerns about the poor implementation and enforcement of EU 
environmental law, and reflected the Commission’s commitment in the Fifth Environmental Action 
Programme (1993-2002) to diversify its regulatory approach.43 
 
Looking at the process of development and elaboration of the EU environmental liability regime is 
particularly interesting in order to identify the external regulatory and legislative developments that 
contributed to shape the final text of the Directive. Indeed, while the European Commission and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Law 8 July 1986 no. 349, in Gazz. Uff No. 162, 15 July 1986, Suppl Ord No 59. See also A. Bianchi, ‘The 
Harmonisation of Laws on Liability for Environmental Damage in Europe: An Italian Perspective’, 6:1 Journal of 
Environmental Law (1996), 21, at 22-26. 
39 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, COM(89) 282; and 
European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on the Landfill of Waste, COM(93) 275. Both directives were repealed 
in 2001. 
40 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2012] OJ C326/47, Article 192. 
41 See M. Lee, ‘The Changing Aims of Environmental Liability’, 14:4 Environmental Law and Management (2002), 
189. 
42 European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Directive on Environmental Liability, 
COM(2002) 17; see also Environmental Liability Directive, n. 7 above, at preamble, paragraph 2. 
43 European Commission, Towards Sustainability – A European Community Programme of Policy and Action in 
Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development, [1993] OJ C138/7. 
	  	  
European Parliament were debating about the scope and modalities of EU intervention in the field, 
a number of parallel developments were taking place at the international level, in several EU 
Member States and in several Commonwealth jurisdictions, particularly the US. 44  At the 
international level, the States that were members of the Council of Europe adopted the Convention 
on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment (Lugano 
Convention) in 1993.45 This Convention played a major role in determining the course of action of 
EU initiatives in the field, and initially also became a possible model for a future EU Directive. 
However, towards the final round of discussions, which led to the adoption of the Directive, it was 
particularly the US CERCLA that played a decisive influence in shaping the shift towards an 
administrative approach to liability.46 
 
Similarly to CERCLA and OPA, the Directive aims to set up a system for the remediation of 
environmental damage, which combines environmental restoration measures with preventive and 
response actions applicable in case of imminent threat of damage.47 Its public law focus emerges 
from the concept of environmental damage, which is framed to exclude traditional forms of damage 
to private property or persons. The Directive applies exclusively to damage to protected habitats 
and species, water and land caused within the territory of the EU Member States during the 
operation of hazardous activities, irrespective of whether these are subject to ownership. Damage to 
water and to protected habitats and species are defined with reference to relevant EU secondary 
legislation, namely the Water Framework Directive48 and the Habitats and Birds Directives.49 
Finally, land contamination assumes relevance insofar as it creates a significant risk for human 
health. The Directive further defines the concept of ‘damage’ as ‘a measureable adverse change in a 
natural resource or measurable impairment of a natural resource service, which may occur directly 
or indirectly’.50 It focuses on accidental types of damage, both major accidents and small incidents, 
which cause or threaten to cause significant harm to natural resources in Europe. However, in 
contrast to the US statutes, strict liability is applicable only in relation to damage caused by the 
hazardous activities listed in Annex III to the Directive, whereas a fault-based liability applies for 
operators of other occupational activities, with the latter being limited to damage to habitats and 
species.51 
 
The influence of the US system is particularly evident in the Directive’s provisions concerning the 
recovery of damage to natural resources and the assessment and valuation of damage. The Directive 
sets up an administrative scheme of environmental liability, which confers a central and almost 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For an analysis of how other ‘external’ factors had influenced the elaboration of a Community liability regime, see C. 
Clarke, ‘The Proposed EC Liability Directive: Half-way Through Co-decision’, 12:3 Review of European Community 
and International Environmental Law (2003), 254, at 257. 
45 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment (Lugano, 21 June 
1993; not yet in force). 
46  B. Jones, ‘European Commission: Proposal for a Framework Directive on Environmental Liability’, 14:1 
Environmental Law and Management (2002), 5. 
47 However, there remain important differences between the US statutes and the EU Directive. In particular, in contrast 
with CERCLA, the Directive does not provide for retroactive application, and its strict liability is more limited, whereas 
CERCLA applies to all releases of hazardous substances. Furthermore, the Directive does not require, but simply 
encourages, EU Member States to establish any sort of financial security or fund to cover restoration and clean-up costs 
although this issue is presently being object of further study by the Commission. See European Commission, Report 
from the Commission under Article 14(2) of Directive 2004/35/CE on Environmental Liability, COM(2010) 581; see 
also Bio Intelligence Service et al., Study to Explore the Feasibility of Creating a Fund to Cover Environmental 
Liability and Losses Occurring from Industrial Accidents, Final Report (European Commission, 2013).  
48 Directive 2000/60/EC of 23 October 2000 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water 
Policy, [2000] OJ L327/1.  
49 Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora, [1992] 
OJ L206/7; Directive 2009/147/EC of 30 November 2009 on the Conservation of Wild Birds, [2010] OJ L20/7.  
50 Environmental Liability Directive, n. 7 above, Article 2.2. 
51 Ibid., Article 3. 
	  	  
exclusive role to the competent authorities appointed in the various Member States in the 
enforcement of the liability provisions against the operator in control of the activities that has given 
rise to environmental damage. The primary enforcement power of the competent authorities, acting 
de facto as public trustees for the environment, is combined with the provision of specific duties for 
the operator in relation to the public interest in the prevention and remediation of environmental 
harm. Under the Directive, the responsible operators are under an obligation to prevent, notify and 
manage environmental damage, and may be ordered to do so by the competent authority.52 The duty 
of prevention arises mainly in relation to an imminent threat of damage and includes the obligation 
to take response measures to minimize and contain the damage.53 In addition to these primary 
duties, the Directive also imposes ‘secondary’ duties of bearing the costs of both preventive and 
remediation measures.54 
 
The Directive therefore replaces the adversarial approach and the triangular ‘plaintiff-judge-
defender’ relationship typical of civil liability schemes with a bilateral relation between the operator 
and the competent authority. Furthermore, by placing specific duties on the operator to inform the 
competent authority, the Directive envisages a dynamic relationship between the public bodies (the 
State) and the polluter, opening the possibility for dialogue, consultation and cooperation. Dialogue 
and consultation occur especially in the identification and implementation of the remedial 
measures,55 and in this sense it vaguely echoes the system of cooperative assessment of the damage 
in the US NRDA regulations.56 
 
Like in the US liability statutes, an important feature of the Directive is its focus on the restoration 
of environmental damage. The criteria for assessing and restoring environmental damage are 
spelled out in Annex II and constitute an important part of the liability scheme laid down by the 
Directive. As far as damage to natural habitats and species and damage to water is concerned, the 
Directive distinguishes different levels of remediation measures, which take inspiration from OPA 
and the NRDA regulations. Primary remediation, consisting of the restoration of natural resources 
and services to their baseline conditions, is the priority. If this option is not feasible, then restoration 
of the environment is achieved through the introduction of a similar level of natural resources, even 
at an alternative site (complementary remediation). Like OPA and CERCLA, the Directive also 
provides for compensatory remediation for interim losses of natural resources services pending 
recovery. Furthermore, the terminology used in Annex II of the Directive, as well as the structure of 
the damage assessment procedure are fairly similar to the US NRDA regulations.57 For example, 
similarly to OPA, Annex II proposes to scale compensatory restoration measures in relation to the 
primary restoration measures, thereby taking into account the level and speed of recovery of natural 
resources and services under primary remediation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid., Articles 5-6. 
53 For a comment on the difference between the Directive and OPA on this point, see L. Jing, M. Faure and W. Hui, 
‘Compensating for Natural Resource Damage Caused by Vessel-Induced Marine Oil Pollution: Comparing the 
International, U.S., and Chinese Regimes’, 29:1 Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation (2014), 123, at 149, 
highlighting that under OPA there is a distinction between removal costs and damages, whereas in the Directive both 
emergency response and restoration are part of the same concept of ‘environmental damage’. 
54 There are, however, cases in which the operator is freed from bearing the costs, such as when the operator can prove 
that the damage or imminent threat thereof has been caused by a third party or resulted from compliance with a 
compulsory order or instruction emanating from a public authority; see Environmental Liability Directive, n. 7 above, 
Article 8.3 of the Directive. The operator is also freed from primary duties when the activity was authorized in the 
public interest in accordance with the conditions laid down by the Habitats and Birds Directives, as well as the Water 
Framework Directive. 
55 Ibid., Article 7.2. 
56 See, however, E. Brans, ‘Liability for Damage to Public Natural Resources under the 2004 Environmental Liability 
Directive – Standing and Assessment of Damages’, in: G. Betlem and E. Brans, n. 20 above, 189, at 211, who argues 
that the NRDA approach is much more cooperative than the one in the Directive. 
57 Ibid., at 205. 
	  	  
 
Overall, one of the main merits of the Directive is that it has drawn the attention of various EU 
Member States to the importance of recognizing and compensating ecological damage to natural 
resources, thereby contributing to a minimum common framework within the EU.58 On the other 
hand, the Directive’s narrow scope of application with respect to the definition of damage, the lack 
of a more active role for nongovernmental organizations and public interests groups, and the 
absence of a subsidiary duty of public authorities to take remedial action, in case of failure to do so 
by the operator, significantly curtail the effectiveness of the Directive.59 Furthermore, the broad 
language of its provisions leaves much of its actual impact to the transposition and implementation 
in the various Member States. Despite these limitations, the Directive still had the positive impact 
of contributing to the affirmation of the notion of ‘ecological damage’ or ‘natural resource’ damage 
at the international level, resulting in a gradual shift towards a public law and restoration-based 
approach to damage to natural resources in more recent international conventions. 
 
FROM THE DOMESTIC TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL: PAST AND CURRENT 
TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY CONVENTIONS 
 
CIVIL LIABILITY APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL HARM IN INTERNATIONAL 
TREATIES 
 
In contrast to the developments in the US and the EU, where the legal recognition of ecological 
damage has gradually translated into the establishment of ad hoc environmental liability regimes, 
the question of liability and reparation for damage to natural resources in international law had 
originally been addressed in a rather incidental fashion within the broader context of liability rules 
aimed at providing prompt and adequate compensation for private victims of environmental 
pollution. Absent a liability regime tailored to address natural resources damage, discussions on the 
ecological and natural resource dimension of environmental harm and relevant mechanisms of 
redress in international law had mainly taken place in the international practice related to the 
definition of international norms of liability for damage caused during the operation of hazardous 
activities. In this respect, the most remarkable international law development has been the 
negotiation and adoption of international treaties establishing uniform systems of private operators’ 
liability for pollution damage occurring during the operation of certain hazardous activities. These 
are essentially private international law instruments setting up common legal frameworks for the 
transnational application of civil liability by domestic courts. The underlying objectives and the 
structure of these treaties reflect basic principles of civil liability. Their main aim is to ensure 
smooth access to prompt and equitable compensation to victims of environmental pollution.60 At 
the same time, they also signal a move towards a distributive justice approach to the function of tort 
law in the context of damage caused by high-risk, yet lawful and socially beneficial, industrial 
activities.61 
 
Although originally designed as private compensation mechanisms, rather than being directly 
concerned with environmental protection, these liability regimes have progressively incorporated 
environmental considerations into the definition of compensable damage. The 1992 Protocol 
amending the 1969 Convention for Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage has been the first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 For an analysis of the limits and opportunities offered by the Directive, see G. Winter et al., ‘Weighing Up the EC 
Environmental Liability Directive’, 20:2 Journal of Environmental Law (2008), 163. 
59 For a critique of the Directive, see L. Krämer, ‘Discussions on Directive 34/2005 Concerning Environmental 
Liability’, 2:4 Journal of European Environmental and Planning Law (2005), 250. 
60 R. Churchill, ‘Facilitating (Transnational) Civil Liability Litigation for Environmental Damage by Means of Treaties: 
Progress, Problems, and Prospects’, 12 Yearbook of International Environmental Law (2002), 3. 
61 J. Barboza, The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), at 36. For 
an analogous move in domestic systems, see M. Wilde, n. 16 above, at 149. 
	  	  
international liability regime to broaden the scope of compensable damage beyond personal injury 
and damage to property to encompass ‘compensation for impairment of the environment’, albeit 
limited to the ‘costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be 
undertaken’.62 Furthermore, by extending the notion of ‘incident’ to cover any occurrence which 
‘creates a grave and imminent threat of’ causing oil pollution damage, the Protocol makes clear that 
compensation includes the costs of preventive measures taken prior to the actual spill to prevent and 
mitigate further damage.63 Compared to the reactive stance of civil liability, this combination of 
reparation duties and preventive measures contributes to framing environmental liability as a mix of 
compensation and ex post prevention, which appear more appropriate to the specificities of 
environmental pollution. In relation to claims for environmental damage, however, the International 
Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Fund – i.e. the Fund established pursuant to the IOPC Fund 
Convention to supplement the liability scheme under the Convention64 – has consistently clarified 
that the civil liability regime for maritime oil pollution would only allow claims for quantifiable 
economic losses which are reasonable, and for the measures that were objectively reasonable at the 
time they were taken.65 
 
This formulation, which has provided the blueprint for the liability provisions under treaty regimes 
subsequently adopted in other areas of hazardous activities and has been retained with some 
variations in subsequent civil liability treaties,66 has contributed to consolidate an international 
conventional practice whereby compensation for environmental damage is admissible, but should 
be restricted to damage which can be determined in precise monetary term.67 Such an approach 
retains the merit of avoiding complex questions concerning the monetary valuation and assessment 
of pure ecological damage and the diminution in value of natural resources. From the perspective of 
the IOPC Fund compensation regime it also allows for striking a balance between the inclusion of 
environmental concerns into the scope of compensable damage and preserving the Fund from a 
flood of excessive liability claims for environmental harm from governments, environmental 
organizations and individuals, which would hamper compensation prospects of private victims.68 
From a broader environmental protection perspective, however, confining compensation to the costs 
of restoration measures would leave aside irreparable damage to natural resources as well as the 
interim losses experienced meanwhile the damage is being mitigated by natural regeneration.69 In a 
global context of increased sensibility for the intrinsic values of natural resources and the collective 
relevance of the environment, it does not come as a surprise that the narrow approach of the IOPC 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 1992 Protocol, n. 18 above, Article 1.6(a). 
63 Ibid., Article 1.6, read in conjunction with Article 1.8. See also the International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) 
Fund 1992, ‘Claims Manual’ (IOPC Fund, 2013), found at: 
<http://www.iopcfunds.org/uploads/tx_iopcpublications/claims_manual_e.pdf>, at 27, specifying that ‘clean up 
operations at sea and on shore are in most cases considered as preventive measures since such measures are usually 
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were in proportion to the threat posed’. 
64 Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage (London, 27 November 1992; in force 30 May 1996). 
65 See IOPC Fund, n. 63 above. 
66 See L. De La Fayette, n. 19 above. 
67 See T. Scovazzi, ‘Maritime Accidents with Particular Emphasis on Liability and Compensation for Damage from the 
Exploitation of Mineral Resources of the Seabed’, in: A. de Guttry et al. (eds.), International Disaster Response Law 
(T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012), 287, at 301. 
68  M. Mason, ‘Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage: Examining the Evolving Scope for Environmental 
Compensation in the International Regime’, 27:1 Marine Policy (2003), 1, at 4. 
69 D. Wilkinson, ‘Moving the Boundaries of Compensable Environmental Damage Caused by Marine Oil Spills: The 
Effect of Two New International Protocols’, 5:1 Journal of Environmental Law (1993), 71; D. Ibrahima, ‘Recovering 
Damage to the Environment Per Se following an Oil Spill: the Shadows and Light of the Civil Liability and Fund 
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Fund generated frictions with more expansive regimes of environmental liability in certain domestic 
jurisdictions and the progressive attitude of some municipal courts.70 It is interesting to remark on 
this point that the US OPA had been enacted as a reaction to the restrictive approach to liability 
under the Civil Liability Convention, and the consequent decision of the US government not to 
adhere to the international regime for oil pollution damage. 
 
But there are also the more general considerations related to the suitability and appropriateness of 
using civil liability to address the special features and specific problems related to environmental 
pollution in an international context. In particular, the ex post and reactive nature typical of civil 
liability claims did not appear fully appropriate to cope with more complex situations of 
environmental emergencies that require the adoption of prompt response measures aimed to 
minimize further damage and to prevent as far as possible the damage and contamination caused by 
the accident from spreading further. Although the Civil Liability Convention and subsequent 
treaties include compensation for the costs of preventive measures, the decision to take such 
measures is ultimately left up to the private operator or the government or public authorities if 
present at the moment of the incident, but there is no specific obligation to take those measures. 
 
Finally, from a more general perspective, the poor ratification rate of most civil liability 
conventions started to raise concern as to whether the negotiation of further liability treaties is 
appropriate and desirable.71 The lack of support for the entry into force of the Lugano Civil 
Liability Convention – to date the only multilateral convention establishing a comprehensive civil 
liability regime for a wide range of hazardous and industrial activities – has raised significant 
doubts as to whether States are prepared to find agreement and endorse a comprehensive 
harmonization of their domestic systems of civil liability for environmental harm at the global level. 
These considerations formed the basis for the progressive departure from a civil liability approach, 
which also addresses traditional damage, towards an administrative/regulatory approach to liability, 
focused particularly on environmental impairment and loss of natural resources. 
 
TOWARDS A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The opportunity to consider an alternative approach to the question of environmental liability at the 
international level arose for the first time in relation to the negotiation of a liability regime for 
Antarctica. Article 16 of the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
envisaged the adoption of rules and procedures on liability for damage arising from activities taking 
place in the Antarctic Treaty area to be included as Annexes forming integral part of the Protocol 
itself.72 It was clear from the beginning that the prospective liability regime should take into 
consideration the special legal and factual characteristics of the continent. For a number of reasons, 
the private law approach retained in many civil liability treaties could not provide a useful source of 
inspiration.73 In particular, the objective of the Antarctic liability framework to provide for 
comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and its associated ecosystems, is rather 
different from the one pursued by the civil liability conventions, primarily concerned with the 
compensation of private victims. Furthermore, the ‘public’, international dimension of Antarctica as 
a territory shielded from sovereignty claims and therefore from the exercise of traditional State 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 M.C. Maffei, ‘The Compensation of Ecological Damage in the Patmos Case’, in: F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi (eds.), 
International Responsibility for Environmental Harm (Graham & Trotman, 1991), 381; see also E.P.H. Brans, ‘Liability 
and Compensation for Natural Resource Damage Under the International Oil Pollution Conventions’, 5:4 Review of 
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jurisdiction, rendered the elaboration of a liability regime different from the more common situation 
of transboundary environmental damage in another State’s territory.74 Finally, the remote location 
of Antarctica and the uniqueness and fragility of its environment required the elaboration of ad hoc 
response measures which, besides clean-up and restoration, would also provide for certain kind of 
preventive measures to avoid further damage as well as concrete means of prompt reaction against 
incidents occurring in the area and threatening serious damage to the Antarctic environment. 
 
In light of those considerations, the Antarctic Liability Annex, adopted in 2005, establishes a 
system of liability allowing for prompt response action to minimize the impact of environmental 
emergencies.75 In terms of structure and approach to liability, the Annex departs slightly from the 
application of the classic civil liability framework common to the other environmental liability 
treaties in favour of a regulatory solution which places the primary responsibility to enforce the 
response mechanism on the State party of the operator responsible for the accidental event resulting 
in an imminent threat of significant harmful impact on the Antarctic environment.76 Article 5 
requires parties to order each operator to take prompt and effective response action, including clean-
up actions, in case of environmental emergencies. Pursuant to Article 6, an operator’s liability arises 
in the event of failure to comply with the obligation to take response action. In this case, the 
operator needs to pay the relevant amount either to the party that undertook the response action or, 
if no response action was taken, to a special fund set up by the Annex. In the event of the operator’s 
failure to take the response action, Article 5 encourages the State party of the operator and the other 
parties to step in and take such action. To address the question related to standing and territorial 
jurisdiction, the Annex entitles the party that has taken the response action to file a liability claim 
against the operator in the domestic court of the party where the operator is incorporated or has its 
principal place of business. To this effect, Article 7 requires parties to ensure that a mechanism is in 
place under their domestic law for the enforcement of the liability provisions and that their courts 
possess the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the relevant action. If, on the other hand, the operator 
is a State agent, the Annex provides for the establishment of an international dispute settlement 
procedure either by arbitration or in the International Court of Justice. 
 
The major limitation of the liability regime put in place for the Antarctic continent relates to its 
narrow scope of application, which is limited to the costs of response action but does not include an 
obligation to undertake restoration measures.77 This leaves out the situation of irreparable damage 
to the environment, as well as the case of environmental damage not caused by an environmental 
emergency, such as the gradual accumulation of harmful effects, or the intentional destruction of 
habitats. Furthermore, it does not provide for a specific residual liability of the State party, but 
merely encourages States to take action in the event of operator’s failure to act. However, given the 
unique set of circumstances surrounding the elaboration of a liability framework for Antarctica, the 
Liability Annex offers an innovative design for a liability regime aimed at protecting public spaces. 
The Liability Annex also signals a gradual move towards a regulatory approach to environmental 
liability. From a comparative perspective, it is interesting to observe that around the same time 
when the Liability Annex was negotiated and discussed, the EU was proceeding with the adoption 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 The preamble to the Antarctic Treaty (Washington DC, 1 December 1959; in force 23 June 1961) expressly refers to 
the role of the continent for scientific research in the interest and progress of all mankind. Article IV of the treaty 
freezes current and future sovereignty claims over the continent, thereby foreclosing the exercise of traditional State 
territorial jurisdiction. 
75 Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Liability Arising from Environmental 
Emergencies (Stockholm, 17 June 2005; not yet in force). 
76 For an analysis of the Liability Annex, see P. Vigni, ‘A Liability Regime for Antarctica’, 15 Italian Yearbook of 
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of the Environmental Liability Directive, which had brought about a paradigmatic shift from a civil 
to an administrative, public-law approach in Europe. 
 
A few years after the adoption of the liability regime for Antarctica, the idea of an administrative 
approach to liability for environmental harm gained further prominence at the international level in 
connection with the elaboration of an international regime on liability and redress for damage 
caused by transboundary movement of living modified organisms (LMOs). The Nagoya-Kuala 
Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress was adopted on 15 October 2010 in 
response to Article 27 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity mandating State Parties to elaborate ‘international rules and procedures’ in the field of 
liability.78 Consistent with the stated objective of contributing ‘to the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity taking also into account risks to human health’,79 liability under the 
Supplementary Protocol is primarily focused on addressing harm to the biological components of 
biodiversity, and their conservation and sustainable use, excluding traditional type of damage to 
private property or land.80 With a formulation that echoes Article 2.2 of the Environmental Liability 
Directive, ‘damage’ is defined as a measurable and significant adverse effect on the conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity,81 while its significance is to be determined on the basis of 
factors including: the long-term or permanent change to biodiversity which cannot be redressed 
through natural recovery within a reasonable period of time; the extent of the qualitative and 
quantitative changes adversely affecting biodiversity components, and the reduction of the ability of 
those components to provide goods and services; and the extent of any adverse effects on human 
health.82 
 
The structure and enforcement of the liability mechanisms evoke the administrative approach to 
liability developed within the EU. The remedies include both preventive measures – which aim to 
prevent, minimize, contain, mitigate or otherwise avoid the damage – and action to restore 
biodiversity either ‘to the condition that existed before the damage occurred or its nearest 
equivalent’; furthermore, when in situ restoration is not feasible, operators are expected to replace 
biodiversity with species and genetic material that is functionally similar, either at the place where 
the damage occurred or as appropriate at an alternative location.83 
 
Like the Environmental Liability Directive, the Supplementary Protocol envisages the appointment 
of competent authorities, which would liaise with the operator in the event of a significant and 
measurable adverse effect on biodiversity. Under Article 5, the operator in control of the LMOs is 
liable to take all the appropriate response measures and to inform the competent authority, whereas 
the latter is responsible for identifying the operator who has caused the damage, evaluate the 
damage and determine the response measures to be taken. However, like in the Directive, if the 
operator fails to take the appropriate response measures, the competent authorities are merely 
enabled, but not required, to take the relevant measures and then recover the costs and expenses 
incurred from the operator. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Cartagena, 29 January 2000; in force 11 
September 2003), Article 27. 
79 Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
(Nagoya, 15 September 2010; not yet in force) (‘Supplementary Protocol’), Article 1. 
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81 Supplementary Protocol, n. 79 above, Article 2.2(b). 
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This regulatory approach to liability in the text of the Supplementary Protocol has been referred to 
as signalling a paradigm shift in the evolution of international liability, at least in conventional 
international law. 84  In the negotiating process, an administrative approach to liability was 
particularly favoured by the EU delegation, which deemed it a more suitable solution to the primary 
purpose of the Protocol, i.e. the protection of the environment and biodiversity.85 In practice, it was 
also the result of the difficulty to reach consensus among parties over a legally binding international 
instrument on substantive civil liability. In fact, whilst several developing countries clearly 
favoured the option of a binding civil liability regime, this was resisted by other States, especially 
Northern and developed countries, divided between those arguing for a completely non-binding 
instrument and others proposing a dual approach – a binding instrument based on an administrative 
approach, and a non-binding civil liability regime. The formation of a group of ‘Like-Minded 
Friends’ (around 80 developing countries plus Norway and including all of the African group) 
favoured the eventual achievement of a compromise agreement, which then provided the basis for 
the text of the Supplementary Protocol. Under this solution, civil liability is retained in one 
provision, Article 12, which requires parties to either provide in their domestic law for rules and 
procedures that address damage by response measures, or aim to provide remedies for material or 
personal damage associated with damage to biodiversity. 
 
Overall, the text of the Supplementary Protocol looks like a compromise solution.86 The provision 
on civil liability is very general and leaves many interpretative doubts concerning the type of 
traditional damage, which can be associated with the transboundary movement of LMOs.87 
Furthermore, the provisions of the Supplementary Protocol are significantly less detailed than the 
Environmental Liability Directive, as well as those of the international civil liability conventions in 
the field of maritime pollution and nuclear damage, thereby giving parties considerable discretion 
when implementing the substantive contents of liability for biodiversity damage in their domestic 
laws.88 Furthermore, in contrast to the Environmental Liability Directive, the Supplementary 
Protocol does not expressly envisage its application in case of imminent threat of damage, although 
the inclusion of preventive response measures, and the reference to a sufficient likelihood of 
damage in the preamble implies that this situation is covered. For these reasons, the Supplementary 
Protocol has been criticized as reflecting a ‘diminished ambition’ in the development of 
international law in the field of environmental liability.89 
 
On the other hand, and more positively, from an international law perspective the provisions on 
response measures and environmental restoration in the Supplementary Protocol can be welcomed 
as a further step in the direction of moving international law away from a compensation-based 
approach limited to the reasonable measures of reinstatement, which are quantifiable in monetary 
terms, to a restoration-based approach encompassing more comprehensively the values of 
environmental components. Further developments in this direction have been made, although in a 
non-legally binding form, with the adoption of the Guidelines for the Determination of Liability and 	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Compensation for Damage Resulting from Pollution of the Marine Environment in the 
Mediterranean Sea Area. 90  Finally, the primary, and almost exclusive, focus on damage to 
biodiversity reflects a conceptualization of liability in international law as not only a tool to provide 
compensation to private victims of hazardous activities, but also as a significant component of 
environmental protection strategies. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The preceding comparative analysis of recent legal developments in the field of liability for harm to 
natural resources has aimed to illustrate a progressive path of convergence across the different legal 
orders – national, regional (European) and international – towards the coexistence of traditional 
schemes of civil liability with new regulatory models of liability based on a public, administrative 
approach to the recovery of damage to natural resources. Furthermore, using the methodological 
framework of global environmental law scholarship in such a comparative endeavour, this article 
has sought to more closely examine the reciprocal influences between different legal orders and to 
identify the emergence of common principles and common regulatory approaches. It has shown in 
particular how specific solutions and methodologies for the assessment and valuation of 
environmental damage and for the definition of the relevant remedies initially developed at the 
national level (i.e. CERCLA and OPA in the US), have been gradually ‘borrowed at the regional 
level, thus forming the basis for further developments in international treaty law. The analysis has 
also illustrated the progressive transplantation of a public interest and regulatory approach to 
liability, materialized in the conferral of specific enforcement action to the State and other public 
entities as trustee for the protection of the environment as a collective and public good. The analysis 
has focused in particular on the upward process of transplantation, from national to international 
law. Yet, the converse relationship of downward influence of international rules on domestic 
jurisdictions is not to be excluded,91 although perhaps it is at present much less evident in the field 
of environmental liability given the still fragmented international legal landscape. 
 
This phenomenon of ‘internationalization’ or ‘transnationalization’ of norms and regulatory 
solutions is in large part a by-product of globalization processes, and is therefore not unique to the 
environment. Yet in the field of environmental protection it is also a sign of a universal concern for 
the environment and of an emerging global consensus on the relevance of protecting environmental 
values.92 In this respect, the use of a global environmental law approach in the comparative analysis 
is valuable as it not only allows for examining possible vertical borrowing and transplants of legal 
solutions from the national to the international level and vice versa, but it also enables us to 
acknowledge the complex dynamics of interaction between different regulatory levels, and the 
different actors and normative processes which contribute to the evolution of environmental law at 
the global level. In the field of environmental liability this interaction manifests itself not only in 
terms of the more deliberate transposition of models and principles from one legal order to another 
– such as in the case of the deliberate modelling of the Environmental Liability Directive upon the 
US Statutes – but more indirectly in the way developments at the domestic level trigger further 	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moves at the international level and globally. 93  A comparative overview of environmental 
legislation in different countries around the world shows how an increasing number of States, 
including but not limited to EU Member States, are developing programmes for the remediation of 
environmental harm94 and are gradually revising their national legislation to remove substantive and 
procedural obstacles encountered by private victims when pursuing transnational environmental 
claims. Interestingly, these legislative developments have been increasingly driven by more 
informal dynamics triggered by individuals, civil society and nongovernmental organizations in 
their concerted efforts to raise global environmental awareness and to obtain compensation for 
environmental harm against corporations in their home country and abroad.95 
 
Global environmental law thus captures the interplay and progressive blurring of the distinction 
between national and international law, and in this sense is a valuable complement to comparative 
legal scholarship in enabling an integrated approach to the analysis of environmental law 
developments.96 A global approach to the study of environmental regulation also allows taking into 
account the coexistence and interaction of legislative frameworks and private regulatory initiatives 
in shaping environmental standards. Although for reasons of space constraints this has not been the 
object of this article, such interaction at the regulatory and norm-making level is evident in the field 
of environmental liability. For example, besides being actively involved in the shaping of the inter-
governmental regime on oil pollution liability and compensation through the International Maritime 
Organization and the IOPC Fund, oil and shipping industries have also proactively regulated oil 
pollution liability and compensation themselves by setting up two distinct private regimes on oil 
pollution liability, TOVALOP (Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement on Liability for Oil Pollution) 
and CRISTAL (Contract Regarding an Interim Settlement of Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution).97 
Most recently, during the discussions for the negotiation of an international liability regime for 
GMOs damage under the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, six agro-biotechnology corporations 
presented their own private contractual system called ‘Compact’ aimed at covering the hypothetical 
damage caused by their products.98 The system became operational in 2010. Although it did not 
have the effect of setting aside the governmental negotiations which eventually led to the adoption 
of the Supplementary Protocol, the Compact offers an alternative process aimed at providing a clear 
and efficient mechanism for a UN member State to file and process claims in the event of 
biodiversity damage caused by LMOs. 99  By joining the Compact, each member accepts 
responsibility to remediate biodiversity damage caused by the release of LMOs by that member. 
 
One final question that remains to be addressed concerns the normative relevance of global 
environmental law from the perspective of the further development of international environmental 
law. In particular, further inquiry could shed light on whether and to what extent the gradual 
convergence among regulatory approaches and the emergence of common normative frameworks of 
a substantive and procedural nature contributes to the shaping of customary rules in the 	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environmental field. The answer largely depends on the approach one takes to the formation of 
customary rules; to what extent conventional developments can be considered expressing opinio 
juris representative of customary rules,100 and the possible role of national legislation and judicial 
authorities in the process of the formation of customary international law.101 With specific respect 
to the question of environmental liability, a further difficulty in providing a conclusive answer lies 
in the poor evidence of State support for a principle of international environmental liability at the 
global level. Nevertheless, both conventional developments and State practice, including practice at 
the national and the regional levels, and the dynamic interaction between different actors and 
regulatory levels, soft law and the work of international bodies, such as the International Law 
Commission102 and the UN Environment Programme,103 are contributing to shaping international 
norms in this field and to better define the role of the States in relation to situations of 
environmental damage. It is still too early to reach a conclusive answer on whether the concept of 
environmental damage and the relevant remedies, as defined in domestic practice and in recent 
liability treaties, are assuming the status of customary rules. Nevertheless, it is possible to assert 
that those developments are concertedly and significantly contributing to the further development of 
international law towards the full recognition of the value of environment and natural resources as a 
common collective good and the full acknowledgment of this value in the context of liability 
regimes and relevant remedial measures. It is ultimately up to those vested with the application of 
the law at the international level, such as international courts and adjudicatory bodies, to participate 
in this endeavour. As a first, positive sign in this respect, it is possible to mention the report and 
recommendations presented in 2005 by the Panel in charge of the question of the depletion of 
natural resources, under the UN Compensation Commission established by a UN Security Council 
Resolution to process claims and pay compensation for losses and damage suffered as direct result 
of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.104 The Panel did not consider that ‘the 
exclusion of compensation for pure environmental damage in some international conventions on 
civil liability and compensation is a valid basis for asserting that international law prohibits 
compensation for such damage in all cases, even where the damage results from a wrongful act’.105 
 
Looking back at the promise made in 1972, this article has aimed to show how, over the past four 
decades, the law of environmental liability has undergone a significant evolution. Thus far, 
Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration has not translated into legally binding international 
norms of State liability for environmental damage. Nevertheless, a number of important normative 
developments and legislative initiatives taking place at the national, regional and international level 
are signalling an emerging international consensus that States are under an obligation to ensure the 
availability of prompt, adequate and effective remedies for environmental damage, including by 
providing apposite response action and restoration measures to address the ecological aspects and 
public law dimension of such damage. The next challenge will, then, be the effective 
implementation and judicial enforcement of this emerging international normative framework. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 R.B. Baker, ‘Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges and New Debates’, 21:1 European 
Journal of International Law (2010), 173. 
101 See J. Wiener, n. 91 above, 1302.  
102 International Law Commission, Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm 
Arising Out of Hazardous Activities, in: Report of the International Law Commission on its Fifty-Eight Session (UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.686, 26 May 2006). 
103 UNEP, Guidelines for the Development of Domestic Legislation on Liability, Response Action and Compensation 
for Damage Caused by Activities Dangerous to the Environment (2010), found at: 
<http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/Guidelinesdomesticlegislation-FINAL.pdf>. 
104 UN Security Council, Resolution 687 (UN Doc. S/RES/687, 8 April 1991). 
105 UN Compensation Commission, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning 
the Fifth Instalment of “F4” Claims (UN Doc. S/A.26/2005/10, 30 June 2005), at paragraph 58. 
